OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive · Lesson

PKCE for Public Clients

Discover Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) and how it protects public clients (like mobile apps) from authorization code interception attacks.

PKCE for Public Clients is a free OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive lesson on CoddyKit — lesson 1 of 4. You can read the complete lesson below for free — then practise it hands-on in the browser with a built-in code editor and a 24/7 AI tutor. It is part of the OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive learning path, one of 4 lessons in the course, and your progress syncs across the web and the CoddyKit app.

Public Clients & No Secrets

Imagine a mobile app or a Single-Page Application (SPA) running in a browser. These are known as public clients in OAuth2.

They run on devices or environments that can't reliably keep a secret.
Unlike a server-side application, they can't securely store a client secret.

This lack of a secret creates a security challenge, making them vulnerable to certain attacks.

Authorization Code Interception

Without a client secret, public clients face a specific risk: the Authorization Code Interception Attack.

An attacker might intercept the authorization code sent back to your app.
If they get the code, and there's no client secret to verify, they could exchange it for an access token.

This means an attacker could gain access to a user's resources, impersonating your application.

PKCE: Protecting Public Clients

To protect public clients from interception attacks, OAuth2 introduced Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE), pronounced "pixy."

PKCE adds a dynamic secret to the authorization code flow.
This secret is created by the client for each authorization request.

Even if an attacker intercepts the authorization code, they won't have this secret, preventing them from exchanging the code for tokens.

Code Verifier: The Client's Secret

At the heart of PKCE is the code_verifier. It's a cryptographically random string generated by the client application for each authorization attempt.

It's a high-entropy secret, meaning it's long and hard to guess.
The client keeps this code_verifier private and never sends it directly to the authorization endpoint.

Think of it as a one-time password your app generates and remembers.

Code Challenge: The Public Proof

Instead of sending the code_verifier, the client sends a code_challenge to the authorization server.

The code_challenge is a transformed version of the code_verifier.
The transformation method (e.g., SHA256 hash then Base64Url encode) is specified by code_challenge_method.

This allows the authorization server to verify the client later without ever knowing the actual code_verifier upfront.

PKCE Flow: Auth Request

Let's trace the PKCE flow. First, the public client (your app) prepares for authorization:

It generates a unique code_verifier.
It transforms this into a code_challenge using S256 (SHA256 hash + Base64Url encoding).
It then sends an authorization request to the Authorization Server, including the code_challenge and code_challenge_method.

Example parameters: code_challenge=xyz&code_challenge_method=S256

PKCE Flow: Auth Code Grant

Upon receiving the authorization request with the code_challenge:

The Authorization Server stores the received code_challenge and its method.
It authenticates the user and obtains their consent.
It then redirects the user back to the client's registered redirect URI, providing an authorization code.

At this point, the client still holds its code_verifier locally.

PKCE Flow: Token Request

Now, with the authorization code in hand, the client needs to exchange it for an access token:

The client makes a POST request to the Authorization Server's token endpoint.
This request includes the authorization code AND the original code_verifier it generated earlier.

This is where the magic happens! The code_verifier acts as proof that this client is the legitimate one.

PKCE Flow: Verification & Tokens

When the Authorization Server receives the token request with the code_verifier:

It recalculates the code_challenge using the provided code_verifier and the stored code_challenge_method.
It compares this newly calculated challenge with the code_challenge it stored in Step 1.
If they match, the client is verified, and the Authorization Server issues access and refresh tokens. Otherwise, the request is denied.

Generating Verifier & Challenge

Here's a simple Java example demonstrating how to generate a code_verifier and its corresponding code_challenge using the S256 method. This is a core part of PKCE implementation.

Try running the code to see the generated values!

import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.Base64;

public class Main {

    public static void main(String[] args) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
        // 1. Generate a secure random code_verifier
        SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom();
        byte[] codeVerifierBytes = new byte[32]; // 32 bytes = 256 bits
        sr.nextBytes(codeVerifierBytes);
        String codeVerifier = Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(codeVerifierBytes);

        // 2. Derive the code_challenge using S256 (SHA256 + Base64Url-encode)
        MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
        byte[] digest = md.digest(codeVerifier.getBytes(java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
        String codeChallenge = Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(digest);

        System.out.println("Code Verifier: " + codeVerifier);
        System.out.println("Code Challenge: " + codeChallenge);
        System.out.println("Method: S256");
    }
}

PKCE Quick Check

PKCE adds a vital layer of security for public clients. Which of the following best describes the primary problem PKCE solves?

Recap: PKCE's Security Layer

We've learned about PKCE, a crucial security extension for OAuth2, especially for public clients like mobile apps and SPAs.

Public clients can't securely store client secrets.
PKCE uses a one-time code_verifier and its transformed code_challenge to verify the legitimate client.
This protects against Authorization Code Interception attacks, ensuring only the intended client can exchange the authorization code for tokens.

PKCE makes OAuth2 flows much more secure for applications that operate in less trusted environments.

Frequently asked questions

Is the “PKCE for Public Clients” lesson free?

Yes — the full text of “PKCE for Public Clients” is free to read here on the web, and the OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive course includes 4 lessons in total. To practise it interactively (a built-in code editor and a 24/7 AI tutor) and unlock the rest of the OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive course, upgrade to CoddyKit PRO.

What will I learn in “PKCE for Public Clients”?

Discover Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) and how it protects public clients (like mobile apps) from authorization code interception attacks. You practise OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive with hands-on code you run directly in the browser, and a 24/7 AI tutor answers your questions as you work through the lesson.

Do I need any experience to start OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive?

No prior experience is required. OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive on CoddyKit is structured for beginners through advanced learners; this is — lesson 1 of 4, so you can start here or from the beginning and move at your own pace.

How long does the “PKCE for Public Clients” lesson take?

Most CoddyKit lessons take about 5–10 minutes. Each one is bite-sized and interactive, so you make steady progress and pick up exactly where you left off across the web and the app.

Can I write and run code in this OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive lesson?

Yes. Every OAuth2 & OpenID Connect Deep Dive lesson includes a built-in code editor, so you write and run real code right in your browser and get instant AI feedback — no local setup required.

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